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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NED C. JENSEN, WOODROW E. 
HAYWARD, RAY F. CROSHAW, 
A. FOSS PETERSON and LOWELL 
D. OSWALD, 
Plainlif f s-A ppellants, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case 
No.10930 
Appellants' Brief on Appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in the nature of quo warranto 
filed by plaintiff property owners for a determination 
that a purported annexation proceeding of Bountiful 
City was void and invalid, and to enjoin Bountiful City 
from exercising any municipal powers over the territory 
of the purported annexation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment 
supported by affidavits. The matter was heard before 
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the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge of 
the Second Judicial District, who granted defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment. The effect of the trial 
court's decision was to uphold the validity of the an-
nexation ordinance of Bountiful City. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the decision of the Dis-
trict Court and a determination that the annexatio11 was 
Yoid and invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not in dispute and are 
set forth in the various affidavits filed by the parties in 
support of their respective motions for summary judg-
ment. The material facts are as follows: 
On December 7, 1966, at a regular meeting of the 
Bountiful City Council, an annexation petition covering 
the territory described in defendant's Exhibit '' F'' was 
considered by the Bountiful City Council. Following 
the meeting, the petition for annexation was permitted 
to be withdrawn because a majority of names of property 
owners did not appear on the petition. The petition was 
later recirculated, and new names obtained thereon, af tcr 
which said petition was refiled on December 14, 1966 
(R-42). 
On December 14, the same day that the annexation 
petition was filed, the Bountiful City Council, in a meet-
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ing <lcsigna ted in its minutes as a "special meeting" 
(R-20), acted upon the petition and passed an ordinance 
annexing the involved territory (R-5, 6, 7). At the De-
cember 14 meeting, a written request was filed on the 
part of 31 property owners that their names be removed 
from the annexation petition (R-38-41). This request 
was presented prior to the time that any action was 
taken on the petition by the Bountiful City Council 
(R-43). 
The 1966 assessment rolls for Davis County (being 
the last assessment rolls) show the names of 373 prop-
erty owners in the area covered by the purported an-
nexation. The petition as filed on December 14, 1966, 
contained the names of 199 property owners whose names 
appear 011 the 1966 assessment rolls. Of the 31 persons 
who requested that their names be removed from the 
petition, it was determined that only 26 had signed the 
petition. Thus if the 26 names were permitted to be with-
drawn from the petition, it would leave 173 names of 
property owners on the petition, or less than a majority 
as shown by the last assessment rolls (R-36). 
After the annexation ordinance had been passed, 
Bountiful City caused to have a title search made cover-
ing the record ownership of the involved territory as of 
Deremher 14, 1966. In doing so, the title searcher com-
menced with the 1966 assessment rolls; then added the 
iiames of all persons acquiring property in the area but 
whose names did not yet appear on the assessment rolls; 
i hen su htrncted the names of persons whose names ap-
pear 011 the assessment rolls but who divested them-
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selves of title as of Decmber 14, 1966. After going 
through this process, it was determined that there were 
431 owners of record of whom 243 signed the annexa-
tion petition (R-11). Using this formula, if the 26 with-
drawing names are permitted, it leaves Bountiful City 
with 1.5 names over a majority. 
Following the passage of the annexation ordinance, 
an additional petition was signed and filed in this action 
by some 44 additional property owners who had signed 
the original petition for annexation stating that they 
had been misinformed as to the facts concerning the 
advantages and disadvantages of annexation, that they 
desired their names to be removed from the annexation 
petition, that had they been given an opportunity to 
sign the withdrawal petition filed with the Bountiful 
City Council on December 14, 1966, they would have 
done so, and that they are opposed to the annexation 
(R-44-50). 
Additional facts which would invalidate the an-
nexation are as follows: The annexation petitions as 
they were being circulated contained no plat, map or 
description of the property proposed to be annexed 
(R-42), although said petitions referred to an attached 
plat (R-27). Further, the circulators of the petition 
misrepresented the area to be included, and descriptions 
of the property given by the circulators to local news-
papers and published during the time of circulation were 
different from the property actually included in the 
annexation ordinance ( R-43). 
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Plaintiffs in this action are all property owners in 
the area covered by the annexation. Before commencing 
the action, they complied with Rule 65 B (d) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, in that they requested the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah to bring and maintain this 
action, and the Attorney General has failed and refused 
to do so (R-43). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFFS AS PROPERTY OWNERS 
HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS 
ACTION. 
·while the authorities are divided, plaintiffs recog-
nize that there is a line of authority holding that once 
an annexation ordinance is passed, the State alone may 
question the validity of the ordinance, the remedy being 
that of quo warranto. Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations, 
~65; 13 A.L.R.2d 1279; 18 A.L.R.2d 1255. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, special 
forms or writ have been abolished, however, the old 
form of quo warranto is now covered by Rule 65 B (b) 
1. Whereas prior to the time of the adoption of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procdure the remedy of quo war-
ranto rested solely with the State, Rule 65 B ( c) now 
provides that the action may be brought by the Attorney 
General, and Rule 65 B ( d) provides that a private per-
son may bring an action in his own name if the Attorney 
Gem•ral fails to do so after notice. Thus in Utah the 
remedy of quo warranto, formerly available only to the 
State, is by statute given to an individual if the Attorney 
General fails to act. The affidavits filed in the cas~ 
clearly show that plaintiffs have complied with the re-
quirement of giving notice to the Attorney General and 
his refusal to act, and said facts remain undispnted. 
The case of State vs. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125 Pac. 
666, decided prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, held that an individual property owner 
could not maintain an action in quo warranto to test the 
validity of an entity kno\vn as the "Wasatch High School 
District.'' This case was controlled by a then existing 
statute compelling the Attorney General to bring and 
maintain actions in quo warranto. The court held in the 
absence of a statute permitting an individual to bring 
an action that his remedy would be to file an action 
against the Attorney General, and if good cause were 
shown, the court would compel the Attorney General to 
bring an action of quo warranto on the relation of such 
individual. The case recognizes that an individual could 
maintain an action in his own name if a statute gave him 
said right, and the purpose of Rule 65 B (d) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, was to provide said right and to 
permit a private individual to commence an action where 
the Attorney General fails to do so after notice (See 
Compiler's notes, Rule 65B (d) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure). 
Although not involving similar issues, this court in 
the case of Sjostrom vs. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 
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472, entertained an action in the nature of quo warranto. 
The action was filed by an individual and his capacity was 
not questioned either by the defendants or by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
The above would seem to answer any question re-
garding plaintiffs' capacity to maintain this action, even 
assuming that the least favorable authorities were appli-
cable in Utah. It is to be noted, however, that another 
line of authorities as ref erred to in the annotations cited 
herein, recognize the right of an individual to maintain 
an action in any event, and particularly in cases where 
it is shown that the annexation proceedings are void. 
It is stated in 13 A.L.R.2d 1292 as follows: 
"In what appears to be a recognized exception 
to the general rule that a private individual is 
without capacity to attack the alteration of 
municipal limits or bounds, the view has been 
taken that where the act of alteration is absolutely 
void, because not authorized by law nor under 
color of law, it is subject to attack by anyone, 
whenever and wherever its validity is questioned 
(Numerous authorities cited)". 
It appears from all of the above that regardless of 
what rule is adopted in Utah, the plaintiffs have full 
standing to maintain this action. The position of the 
respondent that if the plaintiffs have been wronged they 
have no remedy is completely untenable. 
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POINT II. 
THE STATUTORY TEST FOR DETERMIN-
ING WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO SIGN AN AN-
NEXATION PETITION IS DETERMINED BY 
THE LAST ASSESSMENT ROLLS. 
Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 sets forth 
the procedure for annexation and provides as follows: 
"Whenever a majority of the owners of real prop-
erty and the owners of not less than one-third in 
value of the real property, as shown by the last 
assessment rolls, in territory lying contiguous to 
the corporate limits of any city or town shall de-
sire to annex such city or town, they shall cause 
an accurate plat or map of such territory to be 
made under the supervision of the city engineer or 
of a competent surveyor, and a copy of said plat 
or map, certified by said engineer or surveyor as 
the case may be, shall be filed in the office of the 
recorder or town clerk of the city or town, to-
gether with a petition in writing, signed by a 
majority of the real property owners a1nd by the 
owners of not less than one-third in value of the 
real property, as shown by the last assessment 
rolls, of the territory described in said plat; and 
the board of citv commissioners or the city coun-
cil, or board of trustees, at the next regular meet-
ing thereof shall vote upon the question of such 
annexation. If two-thirds of all the members of 
the board of city commissioners or the city council 
or board of trustees, vote for such annexation, an 
ordinance shall be passed, declaring the annexa-
tion of such territory and the extension of the 
limits of such city or town accordingly. A copy of 
the map or plat duly certified shall at once be fil.ed 
in the office of the county recorder, together with 
a certified copy of the ordinance declar~ng such 
annexation, and thereupon such annexation sha11 
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be deemed complete, and the said territory shall 
be deemed and held to be a part of said city or 
town, and the inhabitants thereof shall thereafter 
enjoy the privileges of such annexation and be 
subject to the ordinances and regulations of said 
city or town." (Emphasis supplied) 
It is clear from the placement of the commas in the 
above statute that the phrase "as shown by the 
last assessment rolls" applies to both the majority of 
o\vners and the one-third valuation requirement. Other-
wise, the punctuation would have been "Whenever a 
majority of the owners of real property, and the owners 
of not less than one-third in value of the real property 
as shown by the last assessment rolls.'' Thus, a peti-
tion must be signed by a "majority of the owners ... as 
shown by the last assessment rolls." 
While it is true that punctuation marks are not con-
clusive in the interpretation of a statute and that a court 
will disregard the same if there is an obvious error in 
punctuation, nevertheless it is presumed that the legis-
lature in phrasing a statute knows the ordinary rules of 
grammar and that the grammatical reading of a statute 
gives it correct sense; accordingly an interpretation is 
to be avoided which is contrary to the grammatical con-
struction of the statute. Am. Jur. Statutes, §252. The 
fact that the same punctuation is used in two places in 
the statute would seem to discount the possibility of a 
fogislative error in punctuation. 
Further, as a matter of policy, it would seem that 
the assessment roll test has great merit and would consti-
tute the most practical and better rule. Reference to the 
assessment rolls sets up an objective and easily deter-
mined formula by which the city authorities, the circula-
tors of the petition, those objecting thereto, and any other 
interested parties, can quickly determine how many signa-
tures are required and upon which they can rely. Plain-
tiffs in this case did in fact rely upon the assessment 
rolls and did not have time, nor did they deem it neces-
sary, to make a complete search of the county records in 
determining the number of signatures necessary for the 
withdrawing petition. After the annexation ordinance 
was passed another petition was signed by some 44 addi-
tional property owners showing that they would have 
signed the withdrawing petition had they been given an 
opportunity to do so, and that they are opposed to the 
annexation. 
It would create a very cumbersome procedure to 
adopt the rule suggested by defendant which requires (1) 
reference to the assessment rolls, (2) a search of all coun-
ty records covering all of the property in the proposed 
area to be annexed, (3) computation of additional names 
of new purchasers from the time of the last assessment 
rolls, and ( 4) subtraction of those who have sold property 
from the time of the last assessment rolls. 
Defendant argued to the trial court that the assess-
ment roll test might under certain conditions produce an 
unreasonable result and suggested a hypothetical fact 
situation where a subdivider could subdivide his property 
in the early part of the year, sell all the lots, and not 
permit the new owners to have any voice in an annexa-
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tion if a petition were filed before the end of the year. 
While it is true that ownership may change during the 
year and between the preparation of the annual assess-
ment rolls, it is also true that there are often drastic 
changes in valuation. Defendant might just as well argue 
that if a property owner were to build a skyscraper and 
thus i11crease his valuation to the point of being 90% of 
all surrounding properties, that his neighbors ought not 
to be permitted to file an annexation petition based upon 
the valuation as determined by the last assessment rolls. 
The equitable argument of defendant when applied to 
hoth hypothetical fact situations may be equally the 
same, however, defendant apparently would urge the 
court to make inconsistent interpretations of the annexa-
tion statute. It is not uncommon in our society for an in-
dividual to temporarily lose his voting franchise for a 
short period when he changes his residence. Sometimes 
the privilege of voting must be sacrificed in favor of pro-
viding a workable and practical method of procedure to 
carry out the functions and processes of government. It 
would appear that this is what the legislature did in the 
instant case. 
A further protection against the result of defend-
ant's hypothetical is the statute permitting disconnection 
hy petition to the District Court of a majoriy of real 
property owners where justice and equity require dis-
annexa tion (See 10-4-1, 2 Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
Respondent also argued to the trial court that prior 
to 1957, ~10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the annexa-
tion statute, did not contain a valuation requirement and 
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that reference to the assessment rolls was first inserted 
into the statute in the 1957 amendment requiring those 
petitioning for annexation to meet the one-third va1ua-
tion requirement; it was argued from this premise that 
the reference to assessment rolls only applies to valua-
tion and not ownership. This argument is without merit. 
In amending the statute, it would be completely unreason-
able to assume that the legislature ever intended to set 
a different time for determining ownership from that 
of determining value. It would seem that any presump-
tion in statutory interpretation should he in favor of 
consistency rather than inconsistency on the part of the 
legislature. 
The legislature could have set up any number of tests 
for determining eligibility to sign an annexation peti-
tion. Such test might have been a majority of taxpay-
ers. It might have been a majority of registered voters. 
It might have been a majority of residents in the area. 
Or it might have been a majority of record title owners 
on the date of the ordinance as defendant is attemptin~ 
to assert in this case. The fact remains, however, that 
the legislature did not adopt any of these tests, but pro-
vided that the annexation petition must be signed by a 
majority of property owners ''as shown by the 1ast 
assessment rolls." At C. J. S. Municipal Corporations, 
~44, it is stated as follows: 
"In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the 
legislature has discretionary power to det:rmine 
the conditions or circumstances under which an-
nexation of territory to a municipa1 corporation 
mav be had and where it prescribes conditions, . ' 
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those conditions must be met before territory can 
be annexed.'' 
In the instant case, the legislature in the exercise of its 
discretionary power, set forth the conditions which must 
be met for an annexation. The conditions as prescribed 
by statute must be met, and defendant cannot change 
the conditions or prescribe a different test or rule. 
In the recent case of Thompson v. City of Center-
rille, 18 Utah 2d 174, 417 Pac. 670, the Utah Supreme 
Court in determining who was eligible to vote in a local 
bond election was called upon to determine the constitu-
tional definition of ''such qualified electors as shall have 
paid a property tax." In answering this question, the 
court stated as follows: 
'' ... so far as this act is concerned, means and 
since statehood has meant, those who have ap-
peared as legal owners of real property, as is re-
flected on the official assessment and tax rolls, no 
matter who paid the taxes." 
The court went on to hold that a wife, conditional sales 
vendee, mortgagee, mechanics lien claimant, heir or oth-
ers who claim an equitable or inchoate interest in prop-
erty were not eligible to vote in the election. While it 
could have been argued that a conditional sales vendee, 
for example, is a beneficial owner of property in the 
broad semie, the court's definition was in accordance with 
the language used in the Constitution. 
Thus in the instant case, an owner ''as shown by 
the last assessment rolls'' must be defined and limited 
in accordance with the statutory language used. 
13 
POINT III 
A SIGNER OF AN ANNEXATION PETITION 
HAS THE RIGHT TO REMOVE HIS NAME 
AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE TIME THE 
PETITION IS ACTED UPON. 
At 27 A.L.R. 2d 604 and 126 A.L.R. 1031 are exten-
sive annotations relating to the right of a signer of a 
petition to \vithdraw his name from the petition. The 
authorities are in agreement that signers may withdraw 
their names at any time before filing; the authorities arc 
also in agreement that signers may not withdraw names 
after an ordinance goes into effect. As to the time after 
a petition is filed and before it is acted upon, the authori-
ties are in disagreement. Some say that a signature can-
not be withdrawn after filing, however, the majority 
rule is to the effect that a person may withdraw his name 
from a petition after filing, without any reason whatso-
ever, any time before the petition is acted upon. Utah 
is among those jurisdictions adopting the majority rule, 
the leading case being Hal gr en v. Welling, 91 Utah 16, 
63 P.2d 550. This case involved an initiative petition 
rather than an annexation petition, but the same prin-
ciple is involved. The court in its opinion stated as 
follows: 
"In some cases the matter of protest of withdraw-
al is a matter of statutory regulation. There is no 
provision in the initiative ancl referendum law of 
the state of Utah relating to the withdrawal of 
names from a petition after it has been once 
signed. There is no substantial reason why a per-
son who has once signed a petition may not, at 
any time before the petition has been actecl upon, 
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withdraw his name, and if timely done, his name 
should not be counted. There is a division in the 
authorities as to whether the withdrawal must be 
made before the petition is filed or before it has 
been acted upon. The weight of authority is that 
the withdrawal may be made at any time before 
the petition has been acted upon.'' 
The cases give many reasons for the adoption of the 
majority rule. Courts recognize that signers of peti-
tions sometimes do so hastily or unthinkingly and with-
out consideration of the results. A person's second 
thoughts are apt to be more deliberate and as a result 
of considering both sides of the issue, and would normally 
represent a person's best judgment. 
No contractual relation is involved. There is no 
consideration given for any signatures and a petition 
contains no promise. One signature is not a consid-
eration for another. 
Analogy has been made to a civil action. After 
filing, a plaintiff in a civil action may withdraw or dis-
miss a complaint as a matter of right unless affirmative 
relief is sought. Courts recognize that one cannot at-
tach more importance to a petition than to a summons 
and complaint in a civil action. 
Cases restricting the right of withdrawal generally 
deal with statutory procedures where there has been 
reasonable opportunity to withdraw. 
Applying the Utah rule and the rule adopted by a 
majority of courts to the instant case, if the 26 names 
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were removed from the annexation petition pursuant to 
the request of the property owners made prior to the 
time the petition was acted upon by the Bountiful Cih 
Council, the petition would not have contained a majorit~· 
of owners as shown hy the last assessment rolls and the 
annexation ordinance is thus invalid. 
POINT IV. 
THE ANNEXATION ORDINANCE WAS NOT 
ACTED UPON AT A "REGULAR MEETING" 
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, AND IS 
THEREFORE INVALID. 
Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated states that 
when an annexation petition is filed, it must be acted 
upon at the ''next regular meeting.'' 
Excerpts from the minutes of the meetings of Boun-
tiful City Council held on December 7 and December 14, 
1966, show that even the city itself referred to the De-
cember 14 meeting as a "special meeting" as opposed to 
a regular meeting (R-18, 20). It was admitted that this 
meeting was not held at the time Bountiful City nor-
mally and regularly schedules its City Council meetings 
(R-12). 
The annexation ordinance \YaS passed on the very 
day the petition was filed and at a special meeting. The 
people were not given an opportunity to fu11y consider 
the matter, and many more would have signed the witli-
drawing petition, as indicated by their affidavits, 1rnrl 
there been tim<> an opportnnit~- to do so. It is snhmitte<l 
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that perhaps the very reason why the legislature re-
quired that action be taken at the next regular meeting 
and not at a pre-scheduled special meeting was to avoid 
the results of what happened in this case. 
It has been held that statutory requirements in ef-
fecting annexation must be complied with strictly, par-
ticularl~, where a statute permits a city governing body 
to annex territory in direct opposition to the wishes 0f 
tl1ose whose interests are to be affected. Rhyne, Munici-
/Jal Law, Section 2-34. 
POINT V 
THE ANNEXATION PETITIONS DID NOT 
CONTAIN A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROP-
ERTY WHEN THEY WERE CIRCULATED, 
AND THUS CANNOT SUPPORT A VALID 
ORDINANCE. 
The annexation petitions described the property by 
a plat, referring to "a copy of which plat is attached 
hereto and made a part of this petition," and also refer 
to "the attached map." The uncontroverted facts show 
that such a map was in fact not attached to the petitions 
and that signers were misled as to the areas to be includ-
t>cl in the annexation. Thus the petition by its very terms 
was not complete when signed and circulated. 
It would seem under the rule previously ref erred to 
under Point IV requiring a strict adherence to statu-
tory requirements in annexation proceedings, that this 
defect would be fatal. Particularly should this rule be 
17 
applied where the defendants will be subjected to iu-
creased property taxation of Bountiful City, as is the 
case here. 
POINT VI. 
AN ANNEXATION ORDINANCE IS NOT AN 
E:!\fERGENCY ORDINANCE. 
The annexation ordinance of Bountiful City proYicl-
ed by its terms that it was a measure "necessary for the 
immediate preserYation of the peace, health and safety 
of the city" and thus was to take effect immediate!~· 
(R-7) rather tlian in the normal fashion as proYicled by 
Section 10-6-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953. It is <lifficua 
to conceive how under any stretch of the imagination an 
annexation ordinance would he necessary for the peace, 
health and safety of the city. This is but another indi-
cation of the ·way in which the ordinance was quickly rail-
roaded through, contrary to the wishes of the peopl0. 
Whether or not an emergency exists would only 
make a difference if the court should rule against plain-
tiffs in that the effective date of the ordinance \\'Ould bt' 
' 
extended beyond January 1, 1967, and the residents in 
the area would not be subjected to city property taxes 
for the year 1967. 
This point is moot if the court rnlPs with plaintiff~ 
on the main issnes, which plaintiffs respectfully urge the 
court to clo. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the foregoing authorities, plain-
tiffs respectfully submit that the decision of the trial 
court in this action be reversed. 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
By David E. West 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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